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Unseen is Unsold: Assessing Visual Equity with Commercial Eye-Tracking Data

Abstract
In today’s cluttered retail environments, creating consumer pull through memory-based
brand equity is not enough; marketers must also create “visual equity” for their brands (i.e.,
incremental sales triggered by in-store visual attention). In this paper, we show that commercial
eye-tracking data, analyzed using a simple decision-path model of visual attention and brand
consideration, can separately measure memory-based and visual equity of brands displayed on a
supermarket shelf. In the two product categories studied, juices and detergents, we find that instore visual attention doubles on average the memory-based probability of consideration.
Additionally, our empirical applications and normative analyses show how separating memorybased and visual equity can help improve managerial decisions about which brands to select for
enhanced point-of-purchase marketing activities.

Keywords:
Point-of-purchase marketing, eye-tracking data, probability model, retailing, brand
management, information processing, decision making, consideration set, marketing metrics.

Unseen is Unsold: Assessing Visual Equity with Commercial Eye-Tracking Data
According to the Point of Purchase Advertising Institute, 74 percent of all purchase
decisions in mass merchandisers are made in store (POPAI 1997). Yet consumers look only at a
fraction of the hundreds of alternatives cluttering supermarket shelves, begging for their
attention. In these conditions, creating consumer pull through memory-based brand equity is not
enough. Retailers and marketers know this and are diverting a growing portion of their
marketing budget towards point-of-purchase (P-O-P) marketing (Kahn and McAlister 1997). The
objective of these investments is to attract the visual attention of shoppers in the store and gain
incremental consideration for the brands under their management. We call this incremental
consideration “visual equity,” and in this paper we show how commercial eye-tracking data,
analyzed using a simple decision-path model of visual attention and brand consideration, can
decompose observed consideration frequencies into visual equity and memory-based equity.
Additionally, our empirical applications and normative analyses show how this decomposition
can help improve managerial decisions about which brands to select for enhanced P-O-P
marketing activities.
Concepts and Measures of Point-of-Purchase Marketing
There is ample empirical evidence showing that P-O-P marketing activities influence sales.
Woodside and Waddle (1975) showed that P-O-P signing multiplies the effects of a price
reduction by a factor of six and that it can even increase sales in the absence of price change (for
more recent results, see Bemmaor and Mouchoux 1991). Other field experiments have
documented the influence of shelf space, location quality, and display organization on sales
(Curhan 1974; Desmet and Renaudin 1998; Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994; Wilkinson, Mason, and
Paksoy 1982). Studies of consumer in-store decision making show that P-O-P marketing works
because most consumers come to the store undecided about what to buy, only look at and
1

evaluate a fraction of the products available, and are attracted to in-store displays (Inman and
Winer 1998; Kollat and Willett 1967).
Memory-based Equity Versus Visual Equity
One way to categorize the sources of marketing effects at the point of purchase is to
distinguish between memory-based and visual1 effects (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991;
Lynch and Srull 1982). As summarized in Figure 1, brand consideration is influenced by both
memory-based and visual factors and, in principle, can be decomposed into memory-based and
visual equity. By analogy with Keller’s definition of brand equity (1993, p. 82), we define
memory-based equity as the marketing effects attributable to the factors residing in consumer
memory, such as brand awareness, knowledge and image. In this paper, we measure and model
brand consideration and therefore operationally define memory-based equity as the “baseline”
pre-store consideration probability for the brand (i.e., its probability of inclusion in the
consideration set when the decision is made purely from memory). Similarly, we define visual
equity as the marketing effects attributable to in-store visual attention. Operationally, visual
equity is the incremental consideration gained from looking at a brand at the point of purchase.
As shown in Figure 1, visual equity can be influenced by package design, shelf location,
number of facings, signage and price. These factors are predominantly under the control of the
retailer. In contrast, memory-based equity can be influenced by the awareness, knowledge, and
overall image of the brand and the store (including price expectations). Both the manufacturer
and the retailer jointly control these factors. However, in most cases, the manufacturer devotes

1

Usually, the more general term “stimulus-based” is used. However, at the point of purchase the
perceptual stimuli are almost exclusively visual in nature and given our focus on visual attention we use
the more specific term throughout.
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more resources to and exerts greater influence upon the memory-based equity of a brand, and the
retailer devotes more resources to and exerts greater influence upon the visual equity of a brand.
FIGURE 1
A Model of Point-of-Purchase Marketing Effects
Brand consideration
1
Factors controlled by
the manufacturer

Factors controlled by
the retailer

Package design

Position on the shelf
Number of facings
Price and promotional
displays

Observed
visual
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While there is a consensus on the importance of creating visual equity, few methods are
available that enable marketers to easily and cost efficiently measure the visual equity of the
brands in a retail display or to predict their consideration level as a function of in-store visual
attention and hence help allocate P-O-P marketing effort across brands. Most market research
methods are not appropriate because they focus on evaluation or choice once the alternatives
being evaluated have captured consumer’s attention. In the next section, we review the methods
used in previous studies to measure visual equity: field experiments and consumer surveys.
Measuring Visual Equity
Field experiments have measured visual equity by manipulating a product’s visual salience
and measuring its impact on sales or consumer shopping behavior (e.g., Curhan 1974; Drèze et
al. 1994). Technological advances in computerized simulations have greatly improved the ease
3

and efficiency of experimental studies of visual equity (Burke et al. 1992). One limitation of
experimental studies, however, is that they can be time consuming and costly if one needs to
measure visual equity for all the brands in a display, as would be the case were retailers to use
this measure to guide the construction of planograms or other P-O-P activities (Blattberg and
Neslin 1990). Also, by measuring only incremental effects these measures leave unanswered the
question of the relative contributions of memory-based and visual equity to observed rates of
consideration and choice.
One alternative approach is to collect data on consumer pre-store consideration sets and to
compare them with their brand choices or their recollection of in-store brand consideration
(Inman and Winer 1998). These studies are currently widely used by commercial market
research firms because they estimate visual equity without requiring an experimental
manipulation and because they can easily be mixed with in-store observations of the purchase
process (time spent shopping, number of brands pulled from the shelf, etc.), measures of verbal
protocols, and self reports about the brands seen and considered during the purchase decision
(Cole and Balasubramanian 1993; Hoyer 1984; Park, Iyer, and Smith 1989).
However, in-store surveys cannot provide detailed information on visual search, such as the
number of brands noted, the order of noting, the number of looks on a brand, or whether price
was noted as well as the package, among others. They cannot therefore estimate the impact of
these variables on brand consideration. In addition, research has shown that measuring pre-store
memory-based consideration set can bias in-store brand consideration, and possibly consumer
recollection of the brands seen and considered at the point of purchase (Fitzsimons and Morwitz
1996). In contrast, eye-tracking studies provide detailed measures of in-store visual attention, for
brands ultimately considered and not considered, without necessitating consumer memory or
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verbalization. In the next section, we present basic findings about eye movements and briefly
review academic and commercial research using eye-movement data
Commercial and Academic Eye-Tracking Research
Eye movements consist of fixations, during which the eye remains relatively still for about
200-300 milliseconds, separated by rapid movements, called saccades, which average 3-5° in
distance (measured in degrees of visual angle) and last 40 to 50 milliseconds. Eye-tracking
equipment records the duration of each eye fixation and the exact coordinates of the fovea (the
central 2° of vision of the visual field) during the fixation with a frequency of 60 readings per
second (i.e., one every 17 milliseconds). It then maps the coordinates of the fovea to the location
of each area of interest on the picture (e.g., individual brands on a supermarket shelf picture).
Eye-tracking studies are a niche, but fast-growing, segment of the point-of-purchase market
research industry, generating about $20 million in sales in the US in 2001. Eye-tracking studies
are the method of choice for commercial studies of P-O-P marketing (von Keitz 1988). They are
frequently used to test package design, shelf displays, print and outdoor advertising, direct and
catalogue marketing, and Website design (Young 1996).2 Commercial eye-tracking studies
typically instruct consumers to look at photographs of supermarket shelves or print ads “as they
would normally do.” These studies then report the percentage of subjects “noting” the product
(i.e., making at least one eye fixation on the product). Other measures are collected as well,
including the percentage of consumers looking more than once at the brand and the total gaze
duration on the brand across all eye fixations, but these measures are rarely reported in practice.
Consumer researchers have used eye-tracking data to study how people look at print
advertisements (Fox et al. 1998; Rosbergen, Pieters, and Wedel 1997; Wedel and Pieters 2000),
2

Eye-tracking data are also frequently used in ergonomics studies of human-machine interactions, with
major applications in the area of aircraft cockpit design or software usability testing.
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yellow pages (Lohse 1997), and catalogues (Janiszewski 1998). These studies have shown that
eye-tracking data provide reliable measures of attention to stimuli in complex scenes, such as
brands on a supermarket shelf (Hoffman 1998; Lohse and Johnson 1996; Rayner 1998; Russo
1978). Although attention can be directed without eye movements to stimuli located outside the
fovea, the location of the fovea during the eye fixation is a good indicator of attention to complex
stimuli because little complex information can be extracted during saccades, because foveal
attention is more efficient than parafoveal attention, and because visual acuity deteriorates rapidly
outside the fovea.
Two studies have specifically demonstrated the value of eye-tracking data for measuring
visual attention to products displayed on supermarket shelves. Russo and Leclerc (1994) isolated
the sequences of consecutive eye fixations revealing brand comparisons using a method
developed earlier (Russo and Rosen 1975). These sequences of eye fixations revealed that
consumers making in-store purchase decisions go through three stages: orientation, evaluation,
and verification. Pieters and Warlop (1999) examined the effect of time pressure and task
motivation on visual attention to the pictorial and textual areas of products displayed on
supermarket shelves. They showed that subjects respond to time pressure by making shorter eye
fixations and by focusing their attention on pictorial information. In addition, both studies
showed that consideration increases with the number of eye fixations to the brand.
Overall, these studies have shown that eye-tracking based measures of visual attention to
brands on a supermarket display are good predictors of consumer choices under different task and
context conditions. On the other hand, these studies have not provided a method for separating
the effects of pre-store factors from those of in-store factors, leaving open the question “Is unseen
really unsold?” Second, these studies have not provided much guidance for the allocation of PO-P marketing activities between the brands of the display. Finally, it is useful to test the
6

robustness of the descriptive findings of these two studies, as they were obtained for simple
displays (only one facing per brand, brands well separated from each other, and no price
information) and either few brands (six for Pieters and Warlop) or early eye movement recording
technique (manual coding of eye fixations from videotapes for Russo and Leclerc). In the
following sections, we show how a decision-path model of P-O-P decision making calibrated on
eye-tracking and brand consideration data generated by consumers looking at realistically rich
shelf displays in two product categories can be used to estimate memory-based and visual equity
and thereby accomplish these goals.
An Eye-Tracking Study
Procedure and Stimuli
The data used in our analyses were collected in collaboration with Perception Research
Services, Inc. (PRS) of Fort Lee, NJ, and were slight modifications of the procedure and stimuli
typically used in commercial tests of package designs. Adult shoppers were recruited in
shopping centers in eight US cities and offered $10 for their participation. They were female
heads of household responsible for the majority of their household's grocery shopping. Their age
ranged from 24 to 65, they had at least a high-school education and earned a minimum annual
household income of $25,000. The final group of respondents included a mix of full-time
working people, part-time working people and full-time homemakers. A total of 309 consumers
were recruited, split between the two product categories studied (159 for orange juices, 150 for
liquid detergents).
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FIGURE 2
Shelf Layout and Eye-tracking Measures for Fruit Juices
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FIGURE 3
Shelf Layout and Eye-tracking Measures for Detergents
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Each person was seated and told that she would see a series of ads like those found in
magazines or a series of products like those found in stores. They went through a calibration
procedure requiring them to look twice at a blank 35mm slide with five circles projected on a 4 x
5 feet screen located approximately 80 inches away from the seat.

Their eye movements were

tracked using infrared corneal reflection (ISCAN model #AA-UPG-421), which does not require
headgear. Subjects then looked at four or five training displays and at six pictures of individual
packages or print ads for an unrelated study. For this unrelated study, subjects were only asked to
look at the pictures as they would normally do.
Prior to viewing the last stimulus (i.e., the one used in this study), subjects were instructed
that they would have to say which brands they would consider buying among those shown in the
display. The names of the brands considered were recorded during the eye-tracking task by PRS
staff as respondents verbalized them. After the eye-tracking task, subjects went to a separate
room were PRS staff measured brand recall, past brand usage and general questions about
shopping behavior in the product category. Each interview lasted approximately 20-25 minutes,
of which 5 to 10 minutes were spent in the eye-tracking room.
The stimuli were two pictures of supermarket shelves used by PRS in prior studies, one
representing orange juices and the other liquid laundry detergents. The two product categories
were chosen because of their high level of consumer penetration, repeat purchase, and sensitivity
to P-O-P marketing4. The two categories, however, differ on a number of important variables
related to visual display and consumer behavior. As Figure 2 shows, the picture of orange juices
3

Thus, the 2 degrees of foveal vision covered about 3 inches on the screen. This was less than one shelf
facing (which was 3.3 inches for juices and 6 inches for detergents).
4
Compared to the categories studied by Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen (1996), both categories are above
average in terms of household penetration (87 % for fruit juices and 80% for liquid laundry detergent),
purchase frequency (8.5 times a year for FJ and 5.4 for LLD), and percentage of sales sold on P-O-P
display (11% and 25%), as measured by Information Resources, Inc. (1998).
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consisted of 16 choice alternatives (which for simplicity we will call “brands” throughout the
paper). The brands were defined so as to match the classification used in the verbal interviews,
and they varied in their level of generality. For instance, Figure 2 shows that there are 3 different
brands with the Tropicana umbrella brand name (Tropicana Pure Premium, Tropicana Season’s
Best and Tropicana Pure Tropic) because these three alternatives were coded as separate choices
in the verbal interviews. Similarly, some variations across SKUs were seldom or never
verbalized so they were treated as a single brand. The visual area of each brand is further split
between the price tag area and the package area. The 16 brands of fruit juices are displayed
horizontally on four shelves with a total of 72 facings. As Figure 3 shows, there were 10 brands
of liquid laundry detergents, each displayed vertically on three shelves with a total of 30 facings.
Displayed prices were the regular prices for a food store chain in Philadelphia at the time of the
experiment.
In order to expand the range of memory-based and visual equity that would be observed,
we created two fictitious brands, Jaffa for juices, and Clin for detergents. The packaging of these
two brands were patterned after products sold outside the United States. Their price was
determined during pre-tests to position these two brands as regional or store brands. In addition,
up to four shelf-talkers displaying the brand’s logo were added to some brands in some test
locations. Because the effects of shelf talkers were small and not reliable across product
categories, the data were aggregated across the four test locations for juices (Chicago, Los
Angeles, St Louis, and San Diego) and the four test locations for detergents (Denver,
Philadelphia, Fort Lauderdale, and Boston).
Descriptive Results
Subjects looked at the orange juice display for 25.1 seconds (median = 17.1 seconds).
They noted on average 10.9 brands (defined as at least one eye fixation to either the package or
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price tag of the brand) and considered 2.5 brands out of the 16 available. Subjects looked at the
detergent display for 18.0 seconds (median = 16.8 seconds). They noted on average 7.1 brands
and considered 2.3 brands out of the 10 available. The percentages of subjects noting and
considering each brand is given in Figures 2 and 3. The total time spent looking at the displays is
comparable to, but somewhat longer than, the in-store observations reported for this product by
Hoyer (1984) in the US and by Leong (1993) in Singapore (respectively 13.2 and 12.2 seconds).
The proportion of brands noted (68% for juices and 71% for detergent) is comparable to the
results of Russo and Leclerc (1994), (69% for ketchup, 61% for applesauce, and 60% for peanut
butter) and with other PRS commercial studies.
Table 1 shows the relative frequencies of fixations and consideration for the total number of
observations: 2544 (16 brands by 159 respondents) for juices and 1500 (10 brands by 150
respondents) for detergents. Several brand level results are robust across product categories.
First, few brands are fixated only once. For both categories, brands are more likely to be either
fixated at least twice (with probability .50 for juices and .56 for detergents) or never fixated (with
probability .32 for juices and .29 for detergents) than of being fixated exactly once (with
probability .18 for juices and .16 for detergents). Second, for both categories, there is a strong
relationship between consideration and the number of eye fixations. As fixations increase from 0
to 1 to 2+, the conditional probability of consideration increases from .076 to .143 to .206 for
juices, and from .163 to .227 to .264 for detergents. Finally, although infrequent (2.2% of
observations for juices and 4.3% of observations for detergents), brands are sometimes included
in the consideration set even though they were never noted. The most likely explanations of this
are that some packages are so well known that only peripheral vision is required to identify their
presence or that consumers assume their presence based on past experience alone. Further
research will be required to address this issue. However, the model we develop subsequently
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postulates independent probabilities for pre-store decisions and in-store noting, so this outcome is
consistent with the model.
TABLE 1
Relative Frequency of Number of Fixations and Brand Consideration
Fixations on brand*
Category

Consideration

Juices

Yes

.022

.024

.111

.157

No

.295

.158

.390

.843

Total

.317

.182

.501

1.000

Consideration conditional
on fixation level**

.076

.143

.206

Yes

.043

.030

.155

.229

No

.247

.125

.399

.771

Total

.291

.155

.555

1.000

Consideration conditional
on fixation level**

.163

.227

.264

Detergent

0

1

2+

Total

* The region for brand was defined as pack, price, and shelf talker (if present).
** Means across brand level estimates of consideration conditional on fixation.

In addition to brand-level results, the pattern of fixations on and transitions between
packages and prices was highly reliable across product categories and reveals that much greater
attention was paid to packages than to prices. For juices, 66% of packages are noted; for
detergents, 69% are noted. However, for both juices and detergents, only 25% of prices are noted
at least once. Moreover, as is evident in Table 2, there is a strong tendency to look at packages
first in both categories. For a given brand, transitions from pack to price are 6.5 times greater
than from price to pack. Finally, most visual search involves transitions to a different brand
rather than price-checking for a brand whose package has just been noted. This reinforces the
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results of previous research demonstrating low levels of in-store price information processing in
supermarket purchases (e.g., Dickson and Sawyer 1990).
TABLE 2
Transitions Between First Fixations on Packs and Prices

Category

Transition

Juices

Pack to pack

Detergents

Consecutive first fixations
Different
Same
brands
brand
.511
0*
0*

Total
.511

Price to price

.070

.070

Pack to price

.154

.068

.223

Price to pack

.186

.011

.197

Total

.921

.079

1.000

Pack to pack

.545

0*

.545

Price to price

.090

0*

.090

Pack to price

.126

.077

.203

Price to pack

.150

.012

.162

Total

.911

.089

1.000

* Saccadic eye-movements are always to different locations, the data contains only time to first
look to a packaging unit (usually two or three facings of the same brand), and we aggregated data
to conform to brand level units; therefore, these transition types are impossible by definition.
In summary, the descriptive results are largely consistent with in-store observations and
with the results of earlier eye-tracking studies and are very robust across the two categories
studied. They show that consumer visual information processing at the point of purchase is
limited (a third of the brands and three quarters of the prices are unseen), that across-brands
search is more common than within-brand search, and that brand-first search is more common
than price-first search. These results also provide evidence for both purely memory-based
consideration (hence unseen is not always unsold) and for a positive relationship between the
number of in-store eye fixations and brand consideration (brands fixated more are more likely to
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be considered). As noted earlier however, it could be that additional looks yield additional
consideration or that consumers look multiple times at brands that they have already decided to
consider or some combination of the two. In the next section, we develop a simple probability
model of point-of-purchase decision making that links visual attention and brand consideration in
both ways and allows us to decompose observed consideration frequencies into memory-based
equity and visual equity.
A Decision-Path Model of Point-of-Purchase Decision Making
The main objective of the model is to separate the effects of visual factors at the point of
purchase from memory-based factors as a determinant of brand consideration. In particular,
observed likelihoods of consideration for each level of eye fixation are used to estimate a base
probability of consideration that is due to out- of-store decision making (i.e., memory-based
equity) and the incremental consideration probability due to in-store visual attention (i.e., visual
equity). Empirical results from fitting the model to our data illustrate how the effects of current
P-O-P marketing actions can be tracked and evaluated. We also derive normative implications of
the model that provide guidelines for improving P-O-P marketing actions.
In constructing this model, we have relied heavily Ockham’s Razor. That is, we have
placed great value on keeping the model simple. To our knowledge, this is the first model of this
type in either the marketing or the psychological literature, so prudence suggests simplicity.
Also, the basic data (i.e., the joint frequencies of noting and considering) provide only 6 possible
outcomes (i.e., df = 5) for each brand, so brand-level models must be parsimonious. In future
research, we plan to extend the model to represent more complicated processes, to incorporate
covariates, and to explicitly model potential sources of heterogeneity. At this early stage,
however, our goal has been to keep the modeling simple and look for evidence of robustness and
managerial usefulness.

15

Model Specification
The model was designed for eye-tracking data consisting of joint observations of the
number of eye fixations (zero, exactly one, or at least two) and the consideration decision (yes or
no) for each brand and subject. We model the P-O-P decision making process as a sequence of
events that alternate between sub-decisions to consider the brand and sub-decisions to make an
eye fixation on the brand (see Figure 4). The model assumes that consumers have a memorybased probability of consideration for each brand. This assumption is supported by studies
showing that consumers have a long-term consideration set in memory (Shocker, Ben-Akiva,
Boccara, and Nedungadi 1991).
FIGURE 4
A Decision-Path Model of Point-of-Purchase Decision Making

Consider?

No (1- β) Yes (β)

Look?

Stop (1- α ) Look (α )

Consider?

Stop (1- α )

No (1- β)

Look?

Stop (1- α )

Consider?

Look (α )

Look (α )

Yes (β)

Stop (1- α )

Look (α )

Stop (1- α )

Look (α )

No (1- β) Yes (β)

Decision Path:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Number of Looks:

0

1

2+

2+

1

2+

0

1

2+

Consideration:

no

no

no
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NOTE: α is the probability of an eye fixation on the item; β is the probability of considering the
item.
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The first decision is a memory-based, pre-store consideration that is made before any instore visual information is assessed (i.e., before the brand is noticed). Next, consumers decide
whether or not to look at the brand.5 If the brand is not fixated, no new information is acquired,
and the consideration decision remains unchanged. If the brand is fixated, the new eye fixation
provides a new opportunity to consider the brand. We assume that consideration is irreversible;
that is, having considered a brand, consumers might choose to look at it again but they do not
“un-consider” it. Of course, consumers may still decide not to buy the brand even though it is
included in the consideration set. This irreversibility of consideration is also consistent with our
measurement procedure (i.e., once a subject verbalized a brand, it was scored as having been
considered regardless of subsequent verbalizations).
Figure 4 depicts the nine possible decision paths in the model and the outcomes that would
be observed in our data (i.e., number of fixations and consideration). For brand j, αj is the
probability of making an eye fixation, and βj is the probability of including the brand in the
consideration set. Our data allows us to discriminate between no fixations, one fixation, and two
or more fixations. Therefore, we assume that, if the brand is not in the memory-based
consideration set (which happens with probability 1-βj) the first fixation provides a new
opportunity to consider it with probability βj. Similarly, if the brand is still not considered after
the first fixation, subsequent fixations lead to consideration with probability βj. Each decision
path is mutually exclusive of the others and exhaustive of the possible sequences of events. The
probability that a specific path occurs is computed as the product of its sub-decision probabilities;
that is,
5

As with most quantitative models of perceptual and cognitive processes, we are agnostic regarding
whether the decisions to look and consider are conscious and deliberate, non-conscious and associative, or
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p1j

=

(1-βj) (1-αj), (1.1)

p2j

=

(1-βj) αj (1-βj) (1-αj),

(1.2)

p3j

=

(1-βj) αj (1-βj) αj (1-βj),

(1.3)

p4j

=

(1-βj) αj (1-βj) αj βj,

(1.4)

p5j

=

(1-βj) αj βj (1-αj),

(1.5)

p6j

=

(1-βj) αj βj αj,

(1.6)

p7j

=

βj (1-αj),

(1.7)

p8j

=

βj αj (1-αj), and

(1.8)

p9j

=

βj αj αj.

(1.9)

For each person and brand, an observation is one of the six possible events defined by three
levels of fixation (0, 1, and 2 or more) and two consideration outcomes (y = yes or n = no). The
probabilities for the events observed in our data are easily computed from the path probabilities
as follows.
p0nj

=

p1j,

(2.1)

p1nj

=

p2j,

(2.2)

p2nj

=

p3j,

(2.3)

p0yj

=

p7j,

(2.4)

p1yj

=

p5j + p8j, and

(2.5)

p2yj

=

p4j + p6j + p9j.

(2.6)

some mixture of the two (see Fitzsimons et al. 2002).

18

The overall predicted probability of consideration is the sum across levels of fixation, cj =
p0yj + p1yj+ p2yj. Thus, predicted consideration can be expressed as a function of αj and βj, as
follows:
cj

=

βj + αj βj (1 - βj) + αj2 βj (1 - βj)2.

(3)

Non-Independence of Eye Fixation and Consideration
One immediate implication of the model is that eye fixation and consideration should be
associated. More specifically, it is easy to show that the conditional probability of consideration
given fixation increases with number of fixations. This is consistent with the descriptive results
reported earlier (see Table 1). A somewhat subtler prediction of the model is that the increase in
the conditional probability of consideration as fixation goes from 0 to 1 should be larger than the
increase as fixation goes from 1 to 2+.6 This too is consistent with our data (i.e., .068 vs. .063 for
juices and .064 vs. .037 for detergents). Thus, the model is able to capture important qualitative
aspects of our empirical data.
Visual Equity and Visual Impact
One important aspect of the decision-path model is that it allows a decomposition of
consideration probabilities. It is natural to think of βj as a measure of memory-based equity (i.e.,
it is the probability of consideration if no fixations occur) and the increase in consideration due to
in-store visual attention (i.e., visual salience, αj) as a measure of visual equity. More
specifically:
6

Define py|0 to be p0y / (p0y + p0n), py|1 to be p1y / (p1y + p1n), and py|2 to be p2y / (p2y + p2n),
omitting the brand subscript, j, for simplicity. Substituting terms using (1) and (2) and simplifying the
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VEj

=

cj - βj =

αj βj (1 - βj) + αj2 βj (1 - βj)2.

(4)

Visual equity is therefore jointly determined by the visual salience of the brand (αj) and by
the memory-based equity of the brand (βj). An important, simplifying assumption of this model
is that the in-store consideration probability given a fixation is the same as the pre-store
probability of consideration. Later we relax this assumption and find that the simple model is a
robust approximation for more complex models.
Figure 5A plots total brand consideration (cj) as a function of memory-based equity (βj) for
minimum (αj = 0), moderate (αj = .33), typical (αj = .67), and maximum (αj = 1) levels of visual
salience. The vertical arrows in Figure 5A show maximum visual equity for each level of
memory-based equity, βj. As Figure 5A shows, visual salience (αj) increases visual equity for all
levels of memory-based equity (except βj = 0 and βj = 1). In contrast, visual equity first
increases and then decreases as memory-based equity (βj) increases. Maximal visual equity
occurs when memory-based equity is moderate (i.e., near .5, see subsequent discussions of the
optimal allocation of P-O-P marketing effort across brands).

expressions yields py|0 = β, py|1 = β (1 - β) + β, and py|2 = β (1 - β)2 + β (1 - β) + β. Because 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
this implies py|2 ≥ py|1 ≥ py|0 and py|1 - py|0 ≥ py|2 - py|1.
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FIGURE 5
Consideration (Panel A), Visual Equity (Panel A), Visual Impact (Panel B), and Visual
Responsiveness (Panel C) as Functions of Visual Salience (α) and Memory-based Equity (β)
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Visual equity, VEj, provides a natural performance measure because the unit of
measurement is incremental probability of consideration, and it reflects the assumption that the
effects of visual salience on choice are mediated by inclusion in the consideration set. However,
the same value of visual equity may be regarded as either good or bad depending on the level of
memory-based equity. For example, VEj = .08 is quite good when βj = .05 and the maximum
possible VEj is .09, but rather disappointing when βj = .50 and the maximum possible VEj is .38.
Therefore, it is sometimes useful to index visual equity to memory-based equity. We call this
measure visual impact, and it is defined as follows (see Figure 5B).

VIj

=

100 VEj / βj.

(5)

Because the decision-path model places upper bounds on VEj, VIj is also bounded and
ranges from 0 to 100 [(1 - βj) + (1 - βj)2] and the asymptotic maximum, 200, occurs as βj
approaches 0. This boundedness of visual equity is an important structural property of our model
and reflects the qualitative assumption that visual salience cannot “force” consideration, but can
only provide additional opportunities for memory-based equity to exert its influence. This is the
P-O-P version of the old adage, “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink.”
Model Estimation
As can be seen in Figure 5A, for any given value of αj, cj is a monotonically increasing
function of βj. This function can be inverted to compute βj from αj and cj (see Appendix A for
the formula). In principle, this computation could be made even when the empirical values of αj
and cj come from different sources (e.g., a standard eye-tracking report and a survey measure of
memory-based consideration). However, this computation is exact and provides no statistical
measures of reliability or validity. Fortunately, the eye-tracking study described earlier provides
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richer data. For each brand, our two-parameter model can be estimated via maximum likelihood
from the frequencies with which each of the six possible outcomes occur using the equations in
(1) and (2)7.
In the two panels of Figure 6, observed consideration (dashes) and consideration predicted
by our model (open circles) are plotted as a function of estimated memory-based equity for the
juice and detergents data, respectively. As in Figure 5A, the vertical bars represent maximum
visual equity. Finally, the dotted line represents the maximal predicted consideration under
certain in-store visual attention (αj = 1) and the solid line the (memory-based) minimal level of
predicted consideration under no in-store visual attention (αj = 0). The distance from the
diagonal to the observed consideration marker (open circle) represents the estimated visual
equity, VEj, based on the model. As Figure 6 shows, the fit of our model to the data is quite
good. The predicted and observed consideration values are very close (paired t-value = .36, df =
15, p = .57, η2 = .02 for juices and paired t-value = .71, df = 9, p = .42, η2 = .04 for detergents).
The estimated values of memory-based equity (βj), visual equity (VEj) and visual impact (VIj) are
also given in Figure 2 (for juices) and Figure 3 (for detergents). Goodness-of-fit statistics are
given in Table 3.

7

We used the Solver add-in of Microsoft Excel to maximize the following equation LL = Σj Σi ln(Ii0n

j
p0n + Ii1n p1n + Ii2n p2n + Ii0y p0y + Ii1y p1y + Ii2y p2y ) across brands j and consumers i, where
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
I is an indicator function that is 1 for the observed fixation/consideration outcome and 0 otherwise. Using
multiple starting values for a subset of the analyses checked the operational robustness of the algorithm.
These replications almost always converged to virtually identical solutions, indicating that local maxima
were generally not a problem. Also, the correlations between the exactly computed and maximum
likelihood estimated values of βj are very high (.999 for juices and 1.000 for detergents).
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FIGURE 6
Observed Consideration, Predicted Consideration (for maximal, observed, and minimal
visual salience), Visual Equity, and Memory-based Equity Estimates for Juices (Panel A)
and Detergents (Panel B)
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TABLE 3
Goodness-of-Fit and Mean Parameter Estimates for the Decision-Path Models
Category

Model df -2LL

BIC

c

α

β

β1

β2

VI

VE

Juices

(α, β) 32 6904

7083

.157

.696

.076

---

---

105

.081 .155

(α, β, λ) 34 6904

7100

.157

.696

.076

.074

.080

106

.081 .158

(α, β) 20 4084

4263

.228

.726

.114

---

---

107

.115 .210

(α, β, λ) 22 4070

4266

.229

.726

.166

.070

.065

32

.063 .113

Detergents

VR

NOTE: Parameter estimates and visual indices are average values across brands.
Robustness with Respect to Model Specification
To test the robustness of our simple model, we also estimated a more general version that
allowed βj (i.e., memory-based equity) to change as a result of fixating on the brand in the store
or not. It is possible that the information acquired in the store modifies the probability of
consideration. For example, consumers can update their consideration probability based on price
knowledge or can draw inferences about brand quality from P-O-P marketing activity, such as the
presence of promotional displays or the relative position of the brand on the shelf (Buchanan et
al. 1999). The more general model relaxes the assumption of constant consideration probabilities
across the number of eye fixations by estimating two new consideration parameters: the
probability of considering the brand after the first eye fixation, β1j, and the probability of
considering the brand after the second eye fixation, β2j, defined as follows:

β1j = βj λ1 and β2j = βj λ2

(6)

To simplify subsequent discussion, we will refer to the more general model as the (α, β, λ)
model and our original model as the (α, β) model. The exponential form is simply a convenient
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way to require that β1j and β2j belong to the unit interval, [0,1], given that 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1, λ1 ≥ 0, and

λ2 ≥ 0. Because there are only five degrees of freedom in the observed data for each brand, we
assume that λ1 and λ2 are constant across brands. Thus, these parameters represent a general
tendency for in-store consideration probabilities to be larger or smaller than memory-based
consideration probabilities in each product category. An additional benefit of estimating the
more general model is that it provides a test of the existence of visual equity. If consideration is
completely determined before seeing the store display, and eye fixations result only from
searching for brands in a pre-existing consideration set, then β1j and β2j should be close to zero.
Goodness-of-fit and mean parameter estimates across brands for the (α, β, λ) model are
reported in Table 3. For the juices data, the (α, β, λ) model was not significantly better than the
(α, β) model (χ2 = .8, df = 2, p > .1). For the detergents data, (α, β, λ) model was significantly
better than the (α, β) model (χ2 = 14.2, df = 2, p < .001). However, the simpler (α, β) model was
superior to the (α, β, λ) model for both product categories according to the Bayes Information
Criterion (BIC), which assigns a greater penalty to model complexity. Finally, the estimates of
memory-based equity (i.e., βj) from the two models were highly correlated (r = 1.00 for juices
and r = .99 for detergents). Overall, the simple (α, β) model seems quite robust—especially
given our primary goal of separately measuring memory-based and visual equity.
The (α, β, λ) model also provides a test of the necessity of visual equity by estimating a
version in which β1j and β 2j are constrained to be zero. This constrained version was
significantly worse-fitting than the unconstrained version for both types of data (i.e., the
differences in χ2 were χ2 = 65.8, df = 2, p < .00001, for the juices data and χ2 = 13.0, df = 2, p <
.005, for detergents). This result supports the central assumption in the decision path model that
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in-store visual attention to a brand significantly increases the probability of inclusion in the
consideration set.
Robustness with Respect to Heterogeneity
Clearly, a very strong assumption of our simple 2-parameter model is that of homogeneity
across individuals. This problem can be overcome in cases where the sources of heterogeneity
are known and observable (e.g., see subsequent discussion of the effects of product usage on αj
and βj). However, unobserved heterogeneity is potentially a serious problem (Allenby, Arora
and Ginter 1998; Hutchinson, Kamakura, and Lynch 2000; Kamakura and Russell 1989; Rossi
and Allenby 1993).
To examine the robustness of our estimation methods with respect to heterogeneity, we
conducted a series of Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation, we generated a sample of 150
observations based on the decision-path model (i.e., a sample size comparable to those of our
eye-tracking data). For each observation, αj and βj were drawn randomly from separate beta
distributions, and a discrete observation was simulated according to the model probabilities
defined by (1) and (2) for those parameter values. Nine pairs of beta distributions were used that
represented strong, average, and weak brands (based on our empirical results) and low, moderate,
and high levels of heterogeneity (based on the shape and variance of the distributions). These
nine pairs of distributions are shown in Figure 7. For each pair of distributions, 10 samples were
generated, and αj and βj were estimated by both maximum likelihood and direct computation, as
described earlier.
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FIGURE 7
Beta Distributions Used in Numerical Analyses (solid, α; dashed, β)
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FIGURE 8
The Effects of Heterogeneity on Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates (markers
indicate mean values and bars indicate maximum and minimum values; each point based
on 10 Monte Carlo simulations).
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The results of the simulations for the maximum likelihood method are summarized in
Figure 8 (markers represent parameter means and bars represent the maximum and minimum
estimates across the 10 replicates). Although there is a clear bias in which estimates of αj
increase and estimates of βj decrease as heterogeneity increases, this bias is large only when
heterogeneity is at the highest level. Also, for any given level of heterogeneity, the relative sizes
of the estimates are approximately correct. Indeed, the 10 estimates for a given condition never
overlap with the estimates for a different condition (except for one estimate of βj when
heterogeneity is high). Thus, the simple model provides robust estimates of the mean parameters
across a wide range of heterogeneity and is reasonably accurate in absolute terms, unless
heterogeneity is high.
We also compared the estimates of the maximum likelihood and direct computation
methods. For αj, the two methods yielded similar results across all conditions with low or
moderate heterogeneity. Mean differences were less than .025 and the maximum difference
observed across the 90 simulations was .055. However, when heterogeneity was high, the mean
difference ranged from .025 to .083 and the maximum difference was .125. For βj, the two
methods yielded very similar results across all conditions. Mean differences were less than .005
and the maximum difference observed across the 90 simulations was .007. Although the methods
always produced similar estimates, it is of interest to note that, as for estimates of αj, the
discrepancies were largest when heterogeneity was highest. Thus, the difference in parameter
estimates produced by the two methods (which is observable for any data set) can provide some
indication about the extent of unobserved heterogeneity that is present (given the assumption that
the individual behaviors are well described by our simple model with beta heterogeneity in both
parameters). For the data reported earlier, the pattern of differences is most consistent with a

30

moderate level of heterogeneity and clearly different from what would be expected if
heterogeneity were high (see Appendix B). This provides added support for the robustness of our
model.
In summary, these results show that a simple two-parameter probability model of P-O-P
decision making can provide a robust decomposition of a brand’s consideration frequency into
memory-based equity and visual equity. In the following section, we show how these visual
equity estimates can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of P-O-P activities for specific brands
in the display and for specific segments of buyers. We then derive normative implications from
the model that provide guidance on how to optimally allocate P-O-P resources across brands.
Implications for P-O-P Management
Evaluating the effectiveness of P-O-P activities across brands
Our results reveal large differences across brands for visual equity and impact (see Figures
2, 3 and 6). Brands with many shelf facings or a central location, like Minute Maid Concentrate
and Cheer, performed well insofar as visual equity and visual impact are high (VI = 133 for
Minute Maid Concentrate and VI = 129 for Cheer) and their consideration is near the maximum
value possible as estimated by our model. In contrast, brands like Sunny Delight and Wisk have
high levels of memory-based equity, but relatively low visual equity and impact (VI = 85 for
Sunny Delight and VI = 74 for Wisk), which lowers their overall level of consideration. Thus,
they have substantial room for improvement. A similar problem is evident for Surf and Pathmark
Premium. We note that all four of these identified “poor performers” are located on the left end
of the shelf display, suggesting that this is a low salience region of the display. Thus, one direct
use of our measures is to aid managers in identifying potential problem areas in their P-O-P
activities. In a subsequent section, we will take up the issue of developing optimal policies for
allocating P-O-P resources across brands.
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It is also important to note that even though decomposing consideration into memory-based
and visual equity is essential to evaluating P-O-P performance, the values of VEj, per se, do not
tell the whole story. One needs to consider visual impact, VIj, and the maximum possible values
of VEj in order to assess the relative performance of different brands. For example, as can be
seen in Figures 3 and 6, Sunny Delight has slightly higher visual equity than Dole (14.7% vs.
12.6%), but is much further from it’s maximum level and has hence a lower visual impact (85 vs.
143). Sunny Delight has a larger visual equity than Dole because of its higher memory-based
equity (β = 17.3% vs. 8.8%) but a lower visual impact because it is less salient (percent noting is
65.3 for Sunny Delight vs. 85.4 for Dole). Sunny Delight is therefore gaining less in-store
consideration, relative to its baseline memory-based equity, than is Dole.
Usage Rate and Visual Equity
The decision-path model can also be used to examine how memory-based and visual equity
vary across consumer segments. For example, using information on past brand usage for each
subject, we computed frequencies of fixation and consideration at the brand level for non-buyers,
occasional buyers, and regular buyers. We then estimated a decision-path model for each brandsegment pair using maximum likelihood (as before). Table 4 shows the average values of our
proposed performance measures for these three segments. Memory-based equity is highest for
regular users, supporting the assumptions of our model. Even stronger support comes from the
fact that visual salience (i.e., percent noting) is about the same, regardless of segment or product
category. If people were simply searching for the brands they had already decided to consider,
we would expect higher values of visual salience for regular users than for the other segments.
Visual equity is also highest for regular users, but visual impact is lowest for this segment due to
its high memory-based equity. Nonetheless, the greatest potential gains in visual equity are
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found in regular users. Unfortunately, it is difficult to target regular users with P-O-P marketing
because displays would have to change dynamically and intelligently as shoppers passed by.
Interestingly, technologies with this capability are currently under development (Lorek 2001).
TABLE 4
Summary Results for Non Buyers, Occasional Buyers, and Regular Buyers
Juices

Noting (%)

Detergents

Non Occasional Regular
buyers
buyers
buyers
71.4
71.1
71.7

Total
68.3

Non Occasional Regular
buyers
buyers
buyers
70.5
67.1
77.5

Total
70.9

Consid. (%)

3.7

10.1

57.7

15.7

2.7

17.8

53.0

22.9

β (%)

1.6

4.6

34.3

7.6

1.3

8.6

30.6

11.4

VE (%)

2.1

5.5

23.4

8.1

1.4

9.2

22.5

11.5

121

VI

116
.04

VR

74
.10

105
.40

123
.16

108
.03

88
.18

107
.38

.21

NOTE: These are average values across brands. For the boundary cases in which memory-based
equity is zero (which only occurs for non-buyers), visual impact is set equal to its theoretical
limit: lim (VI ) = 100(α + α ²) .
β →0

More generally, these results raise the question of which brands should receive incremental
P-O-P dollars. Manufacturers seemingly would want to improve their weakest brands. Retailers,
in contrast, typically give the most effort to strong brands. In the next section, we provide
normative results about optimal allocations of P-O-P resources that suggest a surprising answer to
this problem.
Optimal Allocations of P-O-P Resources
The general optimization problem faced by retailers is extraordinarily complex because the
control variables are many (e.g., shelf locations, numbers of facings, and shelf talkers for each
brand in a product category), brands differ (e.g., in brand equity, advertising support, price and
profit margin), and the causal impact of P-O-P activities is uncertain and may vary across brands
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(Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994). In this section, we use our decision-path model to abstract away
from these complexities and obtain results that shed light on how incremental changes in P-O-P
marketing can be optimized.
First, to simplify the analysis, we assume that there is a reasonably direct relationship
between consideration probabilities and sales and, therefore, profit. That is, we assume the goal
is to maximize total consideration across brands and shoppers (and that consideration is
statistically independent across brands and shoppers). Second, we assume that visual salience
(αj) is under the control of the manager, but that memory-based equity (βj) is exogenously
determined for a finite set of brands that are being managed (i.e., as a retailer’s assortment or as a
manufacturer’s product line). Of course, memory-based equity can be influenced by managerial
actions; however, most discussions of brand equity suggest that these effects accrue slowly
(Keller 1997). Presumably, the effects of visual salience are immediately exerted at the point of
purchase. Thus, our assumptions represent a focus on relatively short time horizons or relatively
mature brands for which memory-based equity is at equilibrium. Finally, we assume that cost is
linearly related to visual salience (however, we will examine a form of diminishing returns later
in the section).
Given these assumptions, standard economic reasoning dictates that each incremental dollar
spent on P-O-P marketing should be spent where it will do the most good. That is, it should be
spent on the brand whose consideration will increase most as a result. Moving beyond small
increments to allocating a finite budget across a set of discrete alternatives requires solving some
type of "knapsack" problem. Problems of this sort are extremely complex mathematically and
are typically solved numerically for specific variations of the problem. One method of solution is
to use a “greedy algorithm” that makes a series of small incremental improvements until a local
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maximum is achieved (Chong, Ho, and Tang 2001; Kohli and Krishnamurti 1995; Roberts and
Lattin 1991). Although the greedy algorithm does not always find the global optimum, the
approach is generally regarded as robust, and it also mirrors to some extent the managerial
process of adjusting marketing strategies incrementally. Thus, we focus our discussion on this
type of incremental decision.
Small incremental P-O-P allocations. We define the visual responsiveness, VRj, of brand
j as the derivative of visual equity with respect to visual salience, dVEj/dαj (which is the same as
dcj/dαj because cj = βj + VEj).8 Visual responsiveness is a function of visual salience (αj) and
memory-based equity (βj) and is plotted in Figure 5C. From this figure we see that brands with
moderate levels of memory-based equity provide the best return on P-O-P investments. More
specifically, as αj increases from 0 to 1, the value of βj with maximum responsiveness shifts
from .50 to .39.9 However, the decision most managers face is which of a relatively small
number of specific brands should receive the next investment in P-O-P effort, and there is no
guarantee that the values of βj for any of those brands will be near the value that maximize
responsiveness.
The general implications of the decision-path model for such conditions can be understood
by considering four hypothetical brands depicted in Figure 5C as a, b, c, and d. The most
responsive brand is a, so it should receive any incremental P-O-P effort. However, increasing the
visual salience of a will make it even more responsive so it would receive the next increment and
8

Alternatively, we could define visual responsiveness in terms of finite changes in visual salience that
more closely resemble the effects of real P-O-P actions than do the infinitesimal changes implied by
calculus-based results. Small changes would produce similar results. Large changes could produce
qualitatively different results, so we examine such changes separately in subsequent analyses.
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so on until it achieved maximum visual salience (i.e., αj = 1). Using the same reasoning,
subsequent allocations would be made to brand b until it achieved its maximum visual salience.
Brands c and d have the same visual responsiveness. However, if the same incremental
allocation is made to both brands, then the resulting responsiveness of c will exceed that of d.
Thereafter, all subsequent allocations would go to c until it reached its maximum visual salience.
Note that this same logic applies to solutions obtained using a greedy algorithm.
In terms of visual salience and memory-based equity, brand a is the strongest in the set.
Thus, this example suggests that a “stick-with-the-winner” strategy for making P-O-P allocations
should be optimal in many situations. This strategy gives all incremental allocations to the
“strongest” brand until it reaches its maximum and then allocates to the next-strongest brand and
so on until further allocations are no longer profitable. We contrast this with a “help-the-poor”
strategy in which all incremental allocations are given to the “weakest” brand until it reaches its
maximum and then allocate to the next strongest brand and so on until further allocations are no
longer profitable.
In general, the optimality of stick-with-the-winner strategy will depend on how brand
strength is defined and the relative strengths of the brands in the set over which allocations are
made. One natural, but conservative, definition is that one brand is stronger than another, if it has
higher values of both visual salience and memory-based equity (i.e., a weak ordering on all
brands in the (α, β) space). Thus, in our example, a is stronger than b, c, and d, and b is stronger
than d, but the remaining pairs cannot be ranked. Given this definition of strength it is easy to
show that if a finite set of brands is strictly ordered by strength and the maximum value of βj is

dVRj/dβj = 1 + 2 αj (1 - βj) 2 - 2 βj - 4 αj (1 - βj) βj. Setting this equal to 0 and solving yields only one
root with admissible values (i.e., lying in [0,1]), βj* = (1 + 4 αj - (1 + 2 αj + 4 αj 2)1/2) / 6 αj.

9
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less than .39, then the stick-with-the-winner strategy will be optimal. No similarly general results
emerge if the ordering is not strict or if βj is greater than .39 for some brands.
Large, discrete P-O-P allocations. To obtain more general results, we explored the concept
of brand strength in a series of numerical analyses. In these analyses, a discrete improvement in
visual salience was applied to pairs of brands that differed in strength, and the resulting gains in
visual equity were compared. In particular, it was assumed that a specific P-O-P action resulted
in an independent probability, ∆, that the brand would be noted at each point in the decision path
where the base probability, αj, was applied. Thus, the new probability of a fixation, αj', was
equal to αj + ∆ - αj ∆. This is a natural way to represent singular actions such as adding a shelftalker or end-aisle display for a brand. It also imposes a plausible form of diminishing returns
that works against the stick-with-the-winner strategy, making this a conservative test.
The gain in visual equity from such a discrete action is:

GAINj

=

VEj' - VEj

=

αj' βj (1 - βj) + αj' 2 βj (1 - βj)2 - αj βj (1 - βj) - αj 2 βj (1 - βj)2

=

βj (∆ - αj ∆) (1 - βj) (1 + (∆ - αj ∆ + 2 αj) (1 - βj)).

(7)

In our numerical analyses, brand 1 was assumed to be stronger than brand 2 (i.e., α1 ≥ α2 and β1
≥ β2). We define gain advantage of brand 1 over brand 2, A12, as

A12

=

GAIN1 - GAIN2.

(8)
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Thus, the sign of A12 is an indicator of the superiority of the stick-with-the-winner strategy and
the size of A12 represents the cost of choosing the wrong strategy. A12 is a function of 5
parameters (α1, α2, β1, β2, and ∆), so our approach was to randomly sample parameters and
identify regions of the space where A12 is predominantly positive or negative.
In our first analysis, 2,000 observations were generated by (1) independently drawing ∆,

α1, and β1 from the uniform distribution on [0,1], (2) drawing α2 and β2 conditionally from
uniform distribution on [0,α1) and [0,β1), respectively, and (3) computing A12. A12 was
negative for 61% of the observations and had an average value of -.020 (GAIN1 = .064, GAIN2 =
.084, c1 = .624, and c2 = .297). Thus, across all possible situations the help-the-poor strategy is
slightly favored over the stick-with-the-winner strategy. Also, the optimal strategy shifts from
stick-with-the-winner to help-the-poor as ∆, α1, and β1 increase (i.e., the help-the-poor strategy
is preferred for P-O-P activities with a large impact on visual salience or when the stronger brand
is really strong). A regression of A12 onto ∆, α1, β1, α2, and β2 accounted for 44% of the
variance in A12 and yielded standardized coefficients of -.19, -.47, -.21, .26, and -.35 for ∆, α1,

β1, α2, and β2, respectively. All coefficients were statistically significant. However, an
examination of marginal distributions revealed much stronger and more meaningful results (see
Figure 9). In particular, A12 was always negative whenever β2 (and therefore β1 also) was
greater than .5 (as can be seen in the center right panel of Figure 9), indicating that the help-thepoor strategy dominates as long as memory-based equity is at least moderate for both brands.
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FIGURE 9
Marginal Distributions of the Gain Advantage of Brand 1 over Brand 2 (A12) as a Function
of Visual Salience (α1,α2), Memory-based Equity (β1,β2), and Magnitude of a Discrete P-OP Action (∆)
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A second analysis sampled 2,000 observations with β1 drawn from [.5,1], β2 from [.5,β1),
and ∆, α1, and α2 sampled as before. A12 was always negative and had a mean value of -.055
(GAIN1 = .057, GAIN2 = .112, c1 = .848, and c2 = .690). Follow-up analyses revealed that
positive values did not occur until the lower bound reaches approximately .43. Thus, the helpthe-poor strategy is optimal whenever β1 and β2 are greater than .43. A third analysis sampled
2,000 observations with β1 drawn from [0, .43], β2 from [0,β1), and ∆, α1, and α2 sampled as
before. A12 was positive for 67% of the observations and had a mean value of .014 (GAIN1 =
.070, GAIN2 = .056, c1 = .329, and c2 = .136). Thus, when β1 and β2 are less than .43, the stickwith-the-winner strategy is favored. Stronger results are possible, however. A fourth analysis
was the same as the third with the constraint that α1 = α2. In this case, A12 was always positive
whenever β1 was less than approximately .4 and its average value was .030 (GAIN1 = .069,
GAIN2 = .039, c1 = .308, and c2 = .160).
For discrete actions, these results for pairs of brands are easily generalized to sets of brands
by identifying the brand j for which Ajk > 0 for all k. If we operationally define “impulse brands”
to be those with memory-based equity less than .4 and “destination brands” as those with
memory-based equity greater than .4, then we can generalize these results from pairs to sets of
brands as follows:
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(1)

when all brands are impulse brands, use the stick-with-the-winner strategy, and

(2)

when all brands are destination brands, use the help-the-poor strategy.

In the analyses thus far, brand 1 was assumed to be stronger than brand 2 (i.e., α1 ≥ α2 and

β1 ≥ β2). This approach revealed the nature of the decision-path model, but it is unrealistic,
given our empirical results and the possibility of heterogeneity in both memory-based and visual
equity. Therefore, a fifth analysis sampled 2,000 observations with α1, α2, β1 and β2 drawn
from beta distributions designed to be similar to our eye-tracking data. The means of α2, β1 and

β2 were .5, .20 and .05, respectively. The mean of α1 was systematically varied from .5 to .9 and
heterogeneity was varied as in our earlier analysis.10 However, unlike our earlier analysis
sampling error was not simulated, rather model probabilities were used directly. The reason for
this approach was that we were interested in simulating the behavior of realistically large
markets, not in testing our ability to estimate model parameters from relatively small samples.
For simplicity, ∆ was fixed at .5.
The results of this simulation are given in Figure 10 and are qualitatively similar to our
earlier results (i.e., those of the third and fourth analyses). Except when α1 is large relative to

α2, A12 is positive and the stick-with-the-winner strategy is more successful. Moreover, the
average value of A12 is larger than in the earlier analyses, except when heterogeneity is high.

10

Low, moderate, and high levels of heterogeneity were generated by using parameters for the beta
distributions that increased variance but left the means unchanged. Specifically, the (a,b) parameters were
{(90,10), (9,1), (.9,.1)}, {(80,20), (8,2), (.8,.2)}, {(70,30), (7,3), (.7,.3)}, {(60,40), (6,4), (.6,.4)},
and{(50,50), (5,5), (.5,.5)} for α1, {(50,50), (5,5), (.5,.5)} for α2, {(20,80), (2,8), (.2,.8)} for β1, and
{(5,95), (.5,9.5), (.1,1.9)} for β2.
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Thus, our earlier conclusions appear to be robust with respect to heterogeneity within a realistic
range of parameter values.
FIGURE 10
Numerical Analysis Comparing the Effects (GAIN1 and GAIN2) of a Discrete P-O-P Action
(∆ = .5) on a Strong Brand (i.e., Brand 1, α ∈ {.9, .8, .7, .6, .5} and β =.20) to Effects on a
Weak Brand (i.e., Brand 2, α = .5 and β =.05) in Terms of Difference in Effect Size (i.e.,
A12) and Percent Positive Differences (i.e., GAIN1 > GAIN2) for Three Levels of
Heterogeneity.
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Future Research
This research opens several areas for future investigation. Showing that in-store visual
attention increases brand consideration naturally raises the issue of what influences in-store
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attention. Future research could examine the effects of factors such as shelf position, the number
of facings, and price on fixation and consideration probabilities. Additionally, it would be
valuable to know whether visual attention is mainly controlled by automatic and non-conscious
processes requiring little or no cognitive capacity (Rayner 1998), or if consumers are able to
locate pre-selected brands without being distracted by visual factors that are simply too salient to
ignore. Another important research issue is determining the extent to which researchers can
measure visual attention without needing to collect eye-tracking data. For example the Starch
scores commonly used to measure exposure to print advertisements rely on consumer recollection
of having previously seen the ad. Perhaps asking consumers to recall the brands that they have
seen could be used as an indicator of their visual attention to the brand.
Conclusion
In an era when consumers seem overwhelmed by the number of available products,
marketers are investing large amounts of money and effort to ensure that their brands are seen at
the point of purchase. Yet, it has been difficult to measure the return on these investments
because few data and methods are available to estimate visual equity, the incremental
consideration due to in-store visual attention over pre-store memory-based consideration. Ideally,
marketers would decompose sales into out-of-store, memory-based equity and in-store visual
equity—similar to the commonly used decomposition of sales into baseline and promotional
volumes (Abraham and Lodish 1987). In this paper, we have shown that commercial eye-tracking
data, analyzed using a simple decision-path model of visual attention and brand consideration,
can provide this type of decomposition. Moreover, our empirical applications and normative
results show how this decomposition can help improve managerial decisions about which brands
to select for enhanced P-O-P marketing activities.
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Appendix A: Direct Computation of Memory-Based Equity
from Visual Salience and Total Consideration
As discussed in the text, the (α, β) model implies that the overall consideration probability,
c, is a function of two parameters: the fixation parameter, α, and the consideration parameter,

β. Omitting the brand subscript, j, for simplicity, equation (3) can be written as:
ctotal

β + α β (1 - β) + α β (1 - β) α (1 - β),

=

(A.1)

Solving this equation for β (using Mathematica software and confirming numerically)
yields the following:

β

=

where

k

1
2 ⋅2 3 α 2 (−2 + α + α 2 ) 2 3 1 3 
1 
2α (1 + 2α ) +
+ 2 k ,
1
6α 2 
k3


(A.2)

=

(

− 7α 3 − 15α 4 − 3α 5 − 2α 6 + 27α 4 c + 4 2α 2 − α 3 − α 4

) + (− 7α
3

3

− 15α 4 − 3α 5 − 2α 6 + 27α 4 c

)

2

.

Although this formula is rather cumbersome, it provides a useful method for computing the
unobserved memory-based equity, β, in terms observed estimates of overall consideration, c, and
percent noting (which is a direct estimate of α in the (α, β) model). Visual equity and visual
impact can then be computed as discussed in the text.
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Appendix B: Comparison of Maximum Likelihood
and Direct Computation for Simulated Data

The procedural details of the simulation are described in the main text. For each simulated
data set, α and β were estimated by the maximum likelihood and direct computation methods.
Table B.1 reports (a) the mean difference between the two estimates in each condition (N=10),
(b) the percentage of differences that were positive (i.e., the maximum likelihood estimate was
greater than the direct computation estimate), and (c) the percentage of differences that were
large. A difference was defined to be "large" if it was greater than .05 for estimates of α and if it
was less than -.002 for estimates of β. These cutoffs were based on inspection of the distribution
of values so as to provide a simple index of the level of variation. The same statistics were
computed across the 26 brands in our eye-tracking data. For α, brand strength was defined as
weak for α < .6 (N = 6), moderate for .6 < α < .8 (N = 14), and strong for α > .8 (N = 6). For β,
brand strength was defined as weak for β < .075 (N = 15), moderate for .075 < β < .15 (N = 6),
and strong for β > .15 (N = 5). These categories are consistent with the values used in the
simulation; however, in the simulation brand strength was varied jointly for α and β. For the
data, α and β were assessed separately because brands were often at different levels on α and β.
Nonetheless, the patterns of differences in parameter estimates that were observed in our data
(i.e., means, percent positive, and percent large) most resembled the patterns observed in our
simulations for moderate levels of heterogeneity. The only possible exception is for strong
brands as defined by β (N = 5).
TABLE B.1
The Effects of Heterogeneity on the Difference Between Maximum Likelihood
and Directly Computed Parameter Estimates.
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Heterogeneity
Strong

α Parameters
(Maximum Likelihood Estimate
Minus Directly Computed Estimate)
Low
Mod.
High
Data

Mean
% Positive
% Large

.001

% Large
Weak

% Large

-.010

.000

.000

-.003

-.004

40

100

33

40

60

0

20

0

0

0

0

30

30

60

80

.014

.021

.064

.015

-.001

-.001

-.004

-.001

60

100

100

79

50

20

0

33

0

10

80

14

30

30

100

33

Mean
% Positive

.025

60

Moderate Mean
% Positive

-.005

β Parameters
(Maximum Likelihood Estimate
Minus Directly Computed Estimate)
Low
Mod.
High
Data

.006

.015

.083

.037

.000

-.001

-.003

-.001

60

90

100

100

30

10

0

33

0

0

100

0

0

0

90

20
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